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Question 
1. What evidence is there that innovative finance mechanisms such as Social Impact Bonds 
(SIBs) and Development Impact Bonds (DIBs) in India or other low- and middle-income 
country settings have impacted quality, inclusion and enrolment in primary and 
secondary education?  
2. What view can be drawn on value for money provided by these mechanisms based on 
available evidence? 
Contents 
1. Executive summary 
2. An overview of evidence related to impact bonds 
3. Gathering evidence: issues with the evaluation of impact bonds 
4. Evidence of impact: two case studies of impact bonds 
5. Conclusions 
6. References 
  
                                                   
1 This paper is the second part of a two-part study on innovative financing undertaken for DFID. The first paper is 
‘An overview of innovative financing mechanisms for education in development contexts’. 
2 
 
1. Executive summary 
This report provides a summary overview of the evidence regarding the impact of impact bonds 
(including Social Impact Bonds and Development Impact Bonds) in their application as innovative 
financing mechanisms for supporting education in development contexts.  
Within the education sector, impact bonds have emerged over the last 4-5 years as one 
innovative financing mechanism that uses private investment to support social development. 
From a developmental perspective, this emerging model encompasses two recent and clearly-
defined global trends: firstly, an increased focus on programmes that deliver results and, 
secondly, an increased drive to support collaboration between the public and private sector 
(Innovative Financing Initiative 2014: v). 
Evidence suggests that there has been a significant growth in the application of impact bonds in 
a range of global settings, including for education in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). 
These mechanisms are seen to be particularly valuable when operating in complex, fluid 
contexts (REACH 2017), and, with appropriate design, can also contribute towards the 
development of wider systemic capacity. There is also an emerging literature offering guidelines 
for the development and implementation of these models. These form the basis of a range of 
technical support interventions that can be used to assist in their development. However, due in 
part to their relative newness, a number of issues also exist over the perceived value of these 
models from a market perspective (Lampert 2014: 13; Innovative Financing Initiative 2014: 20), 
plus a lack of evidence on their effectiveness from a social development perspective (Terway 
2018). 
In discussing the availability of evidence on the use and effect of impact bonds for education in 
LMICs, the majority of commentators cited in this review highlight the limited data available. So 
far, only an estimated 15 to 21 impact bonds – whether Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) or 
Development Impact Bonds (DIBs) – have been completed, and few results have been 
published. In addition, there are significant limitations of evidence related to the specific focus of 
this study. According to the Social Finance SIB database2, there are currently nine impact bonds 
worldwide with a particular focus on education and early years learning, and only two impact 
bonds for education operating in contexts that might be described as low- and middle-income or 
as emerging economies. Both are in India – the Educate Girls Rajasthan DIB 2015-2018, and the 
Quality Education India DIB 2018-2022.  
In gathering the evidence presented in this report, this study undertook a broad review of recent 
surveys on innovative finance mechanisms, with a particular focus on education in LMICs. This 
produced a longlist of approximately 20 different currently-used innovative financing mechanisms 
mentioned in documents published between 2010-2018. These include mechanisms associated 
with both international finance (i.e. for global education and/or donor-led finance) and domestic 
finance (i.e. country-specific mechanisms). In addition, across the documents reviewed, there is 
a large diversity of models featured: innovative financing is a complex area of research, with 
many possible variable models. Across the majority of documents looking at innovative financing, 
there is no substantial mention made of those specific mechanisms included in the request 
                                                   
2 https://sibdatabase.socialfinance.org.uk/ (accessed 16.01.19) 
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question itself: SIBs and DIBs. Any information on these mechanisms comes from a small 
number of documents published since 2013, all which look exclusively at SIBs and DIBs. 
In terms of content, much of the literature on innovative financing for development discusses the 
mechanisms and procedures from the perspective of financial management rather than from the 
perspective of social development. In this context, the primary measures of effectiveness are in 
terms of each mechanism’s ability to attract investment, mobilise resources and provide a return 
on investment (see, for example, Lampert 2014; Terway 2018; Innovative Financing Initiative 
2014; Leading Group 2012; Loder et al. 2013). As a result, the literature places a particular focus 
on key developmental sectors seen as ‘high-yield’ (e.g. global health, agriculture and food 
security, and climate, environment and energy), and limits the discussion of education. 
In providing an overview of the available evidence related to impact bonds in particular, 
commentators highlight a number of common claims about their benefits. Firstly, there is a strong 
focus on outcomes, placing greater incentives on results and encouraging service providers to 
adapt approaches to the achievement of the pre-agreed outcomes. Secondly, impact bonds are 
seen to have the capacity to improve existing performance management and encourage the 
establishment of new sector-wide systems. Thirdly, the multi-partner nature of impact bonds is 
seen to encourage collaboration across the public and private sectors (REACH 2017: 6, 11-12; 
Gustafsson-Wright et al. 2017: 13; Floyd et al. 2017: 10; Dalberg 2014). However, commentators 
also note several areas where evidence on the value of impact bonds against their perceived 
benefits has yet to be presented. In particular, DFID has previously concluded that there is 
currently no empirical evidence for or against most of the elements, linkages and assumptions 
related to impact bonds (DFID 2014b, cited in Drew & Clist 2015: 30). 
In seeking to explore further some of the underlying issues impacting on the current availability of 
evidence regarding impact bonds, this report also looks at current approaches to the evaluation 
and data-gathering on impact bonds. There is a currently a broad diversity of approaches to both 
evaluating impact bonds and reporting on the findings, thereby undermining the veracity of 
findings (see Drew & Clist 2015). In addressing this issue in particular, several commentators 
make the case for the development of a uniform approach to evaluation design, as well as the 
need for putting in place a centralised synthesised body of evidence on impact bonds (see Drew 
& Clist 2015; REACH 2017). 
However, based on evidence largely drawn from the case of the Educate Girls Rajasthan DIB 
2015-2018, findings indicate that, with appropriate technical design and highly flexible and 
adaptive approaches to delivery, impact bonds can have a substantial positive impact on 
educational quality in terms of learning outcomes, on educational inclusion, and on school 
enrolment and retention. It is also noted that the design and project management of the bond 
itself are regarded as key factors influencing the attainment of specific social development 
outcomes. In the context of the Educate Girls DIB, evidence of the effectiveness of the bond’s 
approach to design, management and implementation is inferred by the extent to which this DIB 
has operated as a ‘pilot’ initiative informing the design and implementation of the far larger 
Quality Education India DIB 2018-2022.  
In terms of value-for-money, the majority of commentators conclude that the current evaluations 
of impact bonds do not adequately assess whether they represent better value-for-money when 
compared with other financing mechanisms. While there are a range of hypotheses about why 
impact bonds may be preferable to other models of financing in particular situations, so far there 
4 
 
is not an evidence-based case for choosing impact bonds over other funding models (Floyd et al. 
2017: 12). 
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2. An overview of evidence related to impact bonds 
Introduction 
Within the education sector, impact bonds have emerged over the last 4-5 years as one 
innovative financing mechanism that uses private investment to support social development. 
From a developmental perspective, this emerging model encompasses two recent and clearly-
defined global trends: firstly, an increased focus on programmes that deliver results and, 
secondly, an increased drive to support collaboration between the public and private sector 
(Innovative Financing Initiative 2014: v). 
As evidence of this, the emergence of impact bonds has taken place within a wider global 
context of increased non-state educational delivery that has seen, for example: an expansion of 
domestic and international NGOs as key providers in low-resource settings; the growth of low-
cost private schools in India, Pakistan, Kenya, Ghana and Nigeria; and an increased parental 
dissatisfaction with public schools leading to an expansion of the private corporate sector within 
educational markets. It is also reflected by the growth of donor policies exploring public–private 
partnerships (PPPs), such as, for example, DFID’s 2015 strategic model focussing on 
‘development capital’, which presents the private sector as ‘a driver of growth and development’ 
(DFID 2015: 1) and a key contributor of capital for the support of development (DFID 2015: 2). In 
education specifically, the engagement with PPPs is seen in DFID’s Girls Education Challenge, 
which involved entirely non-state providers (Burnett 2014: 19).  
The development of impact bonds has also been informed by donor concerns that, firstly, aid 
from traditional sources will not be sufficient to meet the concessional finance needs of low-
income countries, and secondly, the way that finance is both raised and spent is an important 
factor in ensuring outcomes (Burnett 2014: 21). 
The availability of evidence on impact bonds 
In discussing the availability of evidence, the majority of commentators cited in this study 
highlight the limited data on impact bonds. So far only an estimated 15 to 21 impact bonds 
(whether SIBs or DIBs) have been completed and so it is understandable that few results have 
been published. In addition, existing examples also show a range of different approaches to 
evaluation and to results publication. Together with concerns about opaque and inconsistent 
uses of technical terminology, this impacts on assessments of the quality of available evidence 
related to impact bonds (Floyd et al. 2017: 17).  
However, commentators also acknowledge that as increasing numbers of impact bonds around 
the world complete and mature, greater amounts of evidence on both bond processes and 
sector-specific interventions will become available. Boglidd-Jones & Gustafsson-Wright (2019) 
point towards the range of evaluative publications on impact bonds available through the 
Brookings Institute as evidence of this.3 
                                                   
3 See for example https://golab.bsg.ox.ac.uk/knowledge/resources/?page=1&resource_type=Evaluation+report 
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Evidence on the effectiveness of impact bonds for social 
development 
Commentators highlight a number of common claims about the benefits of impact bonds made in 
the literature and by practitioners. 
Firstly, there is a strong focus on outcomes: outcome funders see impact bonds as a way to draw 
attention to certain results by placing greater incentives to reaching them. The focus on results 
that emerges from the financing mechanism is claimed to encourage service providers to adapt 
approaches in light of feedback, ensuring that interventions are focussed on the achievement of 
the pre-agreed outcomes (REACH 2017: 6, 11-12; Gustafsson-Wright et al. 2017: 13). 
Secondly, impact bonds have the capacity to improve existing performance management and 
encourage the establishment of new sector-wide systems in order to meet the need for the focus 
on outcomes and adaptation. Building on this, their use is also claimed to help build a sector-
wide culture of systemic monitoring and evaluation (REACH 2017: 6, 11-12; Floyd et al. 2017: 
10). 
Thirdly, the multi-partner nature of impact bonds is seen to encourage collaboration across the 
public and private sectors, and across government both vertically and horizontally. They also 
offer the potential to increase collaboration between service providers working in the same sector 
and/or serving the same populations (REACH 2017: 6, 11-12; Gustafsson-Wright et al. 2017: 13; 
Floyd et al. 2017: 10; Dalberg 2014). 
However, commentators note several areas where evidence on the value of impact bonds 
against their perceived benefits has yet to be presented. In particular, DFID has previously 
concluded that there is currently no empirical evidence for or against most of the elements, 
linkages and assumptions related to impact bonds (DFID 2014b, cited in Drew & Clist 2015: 30). 
For example, it is not yet clear whether impact bonds actually reduce the risk of investment for 
government. Nor is there enough evidence that, by securing private investment in specific areas, 
impact bonds enable government funding to be released to support initiatives elsewhere (Drew & 
Clist 2015: 30). 
In addition, the relationship between impact bonds and the use of technical innovation or 
innovative design approaches requires further analysis. While there is evidence of innovation in 
terms of combinations of services provided, new groups of beneficiaries reached, and increased 
adoption of new practices among service providers, as yet impact bonds have not been used to 
support truly experimental interventions i.e. those that thus far have no evidence behind them 
(REACH 2017: 12). In light of both the needs of investors as well as existing questions over the 
extent to which impact bonds can actively foster innovation while still attracting capital 
investments, any claims for innovation also needs to be balanced by some evidence of the model 
working to deliver outcomes, e.g. by introducing interventions or practices that have worked 
somewhere else in the world (REACH 2017: 12; Gustafsson-Wright et al. 2017: 13; Drew & Clist 
2015: 10). 
Finally, there is not yet enough evidence available to show that impact bonds can be used to 
deliver projects at scale, or can be used to sustain impact beyond the project lifetime (REACH 
2017: 12; Gustafsson-Wright et al. 2017: 13).  
7 
 
Evidence on impact bonds in education 
Looking specifically at the use of impact bonds in an educational context, there is very little 
published evidence examining their impact on outcomes related to either educational quality, 
inclusion, enrolment and retention or value-for-money. Evidence from LMIC contexts is 
particularly limited.  
According to the Social Finance SIB database4, there are currently nine impact bonds worldwide 
with a particular focus on education and early years learning, and only two impact bonds for 
education operating in contexts that might be described as low- or middle-income or as emerging 
economies. Both are in India – the Educate Girls Rajasthan DIB 2015-2018 (referred to in the 
rest of this report as the Educate Girls DIB), and the Quality Education India DIB 2018-2022.  
Boglidd-Jones & Gustafsson-Wright (2018i) corroborate the above findings, stating that, as a 
sector, education has lagged behind social welfare and employment, which account for the 
majority of the 134 impact bonds contracted to date around the world. They state that, worldwide 
in 2018, there were only four new impact bonds with a focus on education, only one of which was 
in a LMIC (Quality Education India DIB). However, they also state that South Africa launched a 
SIB with a focus on early childhood development (Boglidd-Jones & Gustafsson-Wright 2019). 
Demonstrating this dearth, REACH (2017: 12) in their review of impact bonds for education in 
development contexts, cite only the cases of the One Service Peterborough SIB (UK, 2010-
2013); the High Quality Preschool, Utah SIB (US, 2013 - ); the Uniting Newpin Social Benefit 
Bond (Australia, 2017 - ); and the Educate Girls, Rajasthan DIB (India, 2015-2018). Of these, 
only the Educate Girls DIB is an exemplar of an impact bond associated with mainstream 
schooling or from an LMIC.  
Drew & Clist (2015), in undertaking a review with a similar scope to that of the REACH study, cite 
only cases of impact bonds from middle- or high-income contexts, none of which are associated 
with mainstream schooling. They partially seek to address this shortcoming by presenting a case 
for the transferral of findings across social sectors and/or economic contexts i.e. by using 
evidence from cases operating high-income settings such as the UK or US to as partial proof-of-
concept for the use of impact bonds in LMICs. The limitations of available evidence on the use of 
impact bonds for education, whether in developed or developing contexts, has led other 
reviewers (e.g. Floyd et al. 2017) to take a similar approach to using data sources from non-
development contexts. 
When drawing on the literature on innovative developmental financing more generally, education 
as a sector remains under-represented. Much of the literature discussing innovative financing for 
development, especially through private financing, places a particular focus on financing 
mechanisms associated with key sectors including global health, agriculture and food security, 
and climate, environment and energy (Burnett & Bermingham 2010: 13). It is argued that this 
reduced focus on education has come about primarily because other sectors, such as those cited 
above, are seen by financial analysts to have a greater potential for investment through technical 
innovation, and for high returns on investment. In support of this, a number of analysts 
acknowledge that, in comparison with these high-investment-potential sectors, education in 
                                                   
4 https://sibdatabase.socialfinance.org.uk/ (accessed 16.01.19) 
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general requires long-term investment and offers only low financial returns for investors (Terway 
2018; Innovative Financing Initiative 2014; Leading Group 2012).  
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3. Gathering evidence: issues with the evaluation of impact 
bonds 
Introduction 
In light of the limited availability of evidence regarding the impact of impact bonds, this section 
provides a summary overview of current approaches to the evaluation of impact bonds, and 
challenges with the evidence that they generate. It goes on to summarise a number of 
recommendations that commentators suggest might help overcome such issues. 
However, while Drew & Clist (2015) make the case for the value of their findings to bonds 
operating in both educational and developmental contexts, it is important to note that, of the 
range of impact bonds they cite as part of their discussion of evaluative approaches to gathering 
evidence, none were operating in settings which might be described as international 
development contexts or LMICs. In addition, none operated within the education sector, or had 
measures related specifically to education outcomes within a schooling context. From the 
perspective of this study, these factors highlight the fact that there is an extremely limited 
literature looking at the evaluation of impact bonds supporting education in development 
contexts. It also raises questions over the extent to which those evaluative approaches outlined 
below can be considered relevant or suitable for projects operating to attain educational 
outcomes. 
What to evaluate? 
In general, there are a range of areas that the evaluation of an impact bond might be expected to 
cover, and the types of questions the evaluation might be expected to answer. However, a 
number of commentators place a particular emphasis on the importance of assessing the 
effectiveness of the bond’s operating mechanisms, its role as a financial tool, and finally, the 
extent to which it enabled the fulfilment of any sector-specific technical outcomes. Within this 
context, key areas for evaluation might include (Drew & Clist 2015: 19):  
• Data on how the impact bond functioned and operated to produce outcomes, i.e. the 
processes involved.  
• Data on the roles of different actors and the relationships between them.  
• Evidence of the extent to which the impact bond promoted ‘innovation’ in approaches to 
social development.  
• Data on the added-value of using an impact bond, in terms of cost savings for 
government or donors as outcome funders 
The Working Group on DIBs (CGD & Social Finance 2013a, cited in Drew & Clist 2015) places 
an emphasis on the need for rigorous independent evaluation of impact bonds, and the use of 
evaluation to generate: 
• Information on intervention costs and pricing of outcomes and results. 
• Assessments on whether and how the structure helped to lead to improved outcomes.  
• Details of any positive or negative externalities.  
• Guidelines to improve the future design of results-based contracts.  
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Further to this, the Group also specifies the role of evaluation in generating evidence on (CGD & 
Social Finance 2013b, cited in Drew & Clist):  
• Whether and how the bond structure changed incentives and led to greater transparency 
around the impact of donor funding.  
• Whether and how the bond structure led to greater innovation. 
• Whether and how the bond resulted in greater efficiency in terms of services, stakeholder 
relationships and value-for-money. 
Building on this, there is a range of suggestions for the specific issues that any evaluation of an 
impact bond should seek to cover. The Centre for Social Impact Bonds (2013, cited in Drew & 
Clist 2015) proposed the following as key evaluative questions:  
• What difference did the services make? (i.e. impact evaluation)  
• How were the services delivered? (i.e. process evaluation)  
• Did the benefits of the social impact bond justify the costs? (i.e. economic evaluation or 
evaluation of value-for-money)  
• What was the effect of using a payment-by-results, and more specifically the social 
impact bond, model? (i.e. evaluating the specific benefits of using an impact investment 
approach) 
In using this to guide the choice of evaluation methodology, Gustafsson-Wright et al. (2017: 49) 
state that the selection of methodology can depend on five considerations:  
• what the outcome funder is seeking to achieve; 
• contextual issues, such as the availability of data or the presence of a comparison group;  
• the timeline of the contract and how much time there will be for data collection;  
• the evaluation budget;  
• the political sensitivities around the transaction or the intervention.  
Beyond this, further determinants of evaluation methodology could include data availability, 
measurement tool availability, evaluation costs, stakeholder capacity to collect and analyse data, 
and the existence of comparison groups. For example, if the goal is to achieve a set of outcomes 
and pay only for success, validated administrative data can be used, but if the aim is to 
determine the achievement of outcomes relative to a counterfactual, an Randomised Control 
Trial (RCT) may be the most appropriate methodology (Gustafsson-Wright et al. 2017: 50). 
Issues with approaches to evaluation and evidence-gathering in 
impact bonds 
In providing a programme environment that is conducive to effective evaluation of impact bonds, 
several commentators highlight the key roles of the Intermediary as project manager and the 
Evaluator. These stakeholders are seen to have a key influence on guiding both programme 
design and implementation to help ensure clear means of verification for outcomes (Drew & Clist 
2015; Floyd et al. 2017).  
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In undertaking the evaluation itself, the Working Group (CGD & Social Finance 2013b, cited in 
Drew & Clist 2015) discuss 3 basic options that can be used, applying either experimental, quasi-
experimental or non-experimental approaches. They also highlight the existing challenges 
associated with the application of each approach. 
• Experimental approaches to evaluation 
Drew & Clist (2015: 20) state that, firstly, the form of experimental approach proposed appears to 
be a cluster-based, randomised control trial, a model which is also supported by other 
commentators (e.g. REACH 2017; Floyd 2017). The Working Group give some examples to 
illustrate this model, but Drew & Clist (2015: 21) state that they do not adequately explore the 
fact that some programmes are designed or delivered in ways which make experimental 
assessment through individual randomisation logistically difficult.  
Gustafsson-Wright et al. (2017: 50) support this point, stating that there is considerable concern 
around whether impact bonds are suitable for evaluation through an RCT. In some cases, 
pressure may come from stakeholders to evaluate with an RCT, because of the rigor of this 
method. For several reasons, however, they state that an RCT may not be the best strategy. 
First, with impact bonds the focus is on results achieved, rather than on the effects of specific 
interventions. Moreover, if the goal is to meet a set of targets, rather than to test the causal 
relationship between treatments and outcomes, an expensive RCT may be less necessary for 
this purpose. 
• Quasi-experimental approaches to evaluation 
The quasi-experimental approach proposed by the Working Group (CGD & Social Finance 
2013b, cited in Drew & Clist 2015) is described as a ‘live comparison group’, a matched, non-
random comparison. In critiquing this, Drew & Clist (2015: 20) state that that there is not 
adequate recognition that, logistically, this method would still probably require multiple 
intervention and comparison groups. They also state that other quasi-experimental approaches, 
such as a discontinuity design, are not considered.  
Against this, Drew & Clist cite the case of the Peterborough Reoffenders SIB in the UK, which 
commenced in 2010 and is regarded as the first impact bond, as an example of a bond which 
used a quasi-experimental approach to evaluation. Using a methodology which focussed on the 
collection of interview data, the project concluded that the development of a methodologically-
robust outcome measure which had the confidence of all stakeholders was a time-consuming 
and analytically complex process. It recommended that those involved in future impact bonds 
and payment-by-results arrangements might wish to take into account the time and skills needed 
to develop robust evaluation measures (Rand, 2011; Disley et al., 2011, cited in Drew & Clist 
2015: 21). In discussing this high-profile case, Drew & Clist (2015: 22) also advise caution in 
placing too much emphasis on findings from a single example, particularly in light of concerns 
over data quality, alongside relatively little qualitative analysis of contextual causal mechanisms.  
• Non-experimental approaches to evaluation 
The non-experimental approach presented by the Working Group (CGD & Social Finance 2013b, 
cited in Drew & Clist 2015) is referred to as a ‘historical baseline’, drawing on pervious data 
related to the same or similar beneficiary groups. Drew & Clist (2015; 20) state that, while it may 
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be possible to use this approach where the baseline is either static over time or where there is a 
predictable trend, previous experience of using this approach in evaluating other forms of 
Payment-by-Results financing has been problematic.  
Against this, Drew & Clist (2015: 22-24) cite the cases of a broad range of impact bonds 
operating in a range of contexts. They conclude that all impact bonds have a built-in evaluation 
mechanism that can generate evidence of impact across a range of criteria, but often only 
because payment is triggered by levels of performance in programme participants. In practical 
terms, support for high quality evaluation was not a priority beyond this payment-driven measure, 
although key stakeholders frequently need capacity development in evaluation and impact 
measurement. Furthermore, there were challenges in measuring and capturing savings made 
through impact bonds as a financing mechanism, with evidence of different views of how savings 
should be measured and calculated and in determining outcome measures. Finally, while the use 
of impact bonds is frequently considered as an exercise in innovation in a number of areas 
including financing, contracting and measurement, this has not yet been supported by the 
development of a sound evidence base across these areas (Dalberg 2014: 23). 
Approaches to improve evaluation and evidence gathering in 
impact bonds 
In response to the issues associated with the various modes of evaluation outlined above, Drew 
& Clist (2015) offer two approaches to addressing current shortcomings with evidence gathering 
on impact bonds.  
Under the first approach, they outline an organising framework for the evaluation of impact bonds 
that enables stakeholder interests at multiple levels to be considered – a general model that is 
supported by other advocates (see, for example, Dalberg 2014; Lampert 2014). In essence their 
model involves the evaluation process following the projected theory of change, where inputs into 
an impact bond lead to a number of processes, which in turn are expected to produce particular 
impacts (2015: 29-30). They see that adopting a framework of this nature could have a number 
of significant advantages in evaluating impact bonds in the future, and would go some way to 
addressing DFID’s 2014 conclusion that there is currently no empirical evidence for or against 
most of the elements, linkages and assumptions related to DIBs (DFID 2014b, cited in Drew & 
Clist 2015: 30). This framework-based approach to evaluation design is also echoed in the notion 
of wider impact bond design-sharing across impact bonds advocated for by REACH (2017: 10). 
In discussing evaluation design, Drew & Clist conclude that, while experimental and quasi-
experimental assessment models such as control-group comparisons would be preferred for 
assessing the impact of individual impact bonds, for practical and contextual reasons it seems 
unlikely that this will become common practice within individual bonds (Drew & Clist 2015: 35). 
However, they do raise the possibility of using historical baseline data as one possible, context-
specific, alternative. 
Under the second approach, they highlight the potential that a synthesised approach to gathering 
evidence might have for impact bonds, a model of information sharing that is also supported by 
Dalberg (2014: 24). In the first instance, Drew & Clist accept it is unlikely that individual bonds 
will be sufficiently similar in terms of context, sector, size etc. to allow them to be treated as 
individual experiments from which comparable data could be aggregated (Drew & Clist 2015: 3). 
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However, by having a common impact bond evaluation framework such as argued for above, 
they claim it should be possible to synthesise evidence from individual evaluations.  
For impact bonds in particular, there is a priority placed on the role of data, and the need for 
service providers to be able to gather, analyse, and respond to information to achieve outcomes 
(Boglidd-Jones & Gustafsson-Wright 2019). The Working Group on DIBS (Centre for Global 
Development and Social Finance, 2013b, cited in Drew & Clist 2015: 26) conclude that, in order 
to ensure that learning is shared, it would be helpful to establish a DIB Community of Practice 
(including potential donors, investors, intermediaries and developing country governments) to 
share learning from DIBs and to inform the development and application of such models in the 
future. Within this, lessons learnt from SIBs in middle- and high-income countries, and from other 
forms of Payment-By-Results (PbR) contracts are also considered of relevance.  
Conclusions 
In concluding their review of approaches to the evaluation of impact bonds, Drew & Clist highlight 
the fact that robust evaluation should remain a key component of impact bond design for the 
‘foreseeable future’, based on the relative novelty of DIBs and the paucity of the existing 
evidence base (2015: 28). In this context, they highlight the importance of using formative 
evaluation to shape the design and set-up of impact bonds. Building in evaluation from the 
earliest stage of design is seen to help provide stronger evidence and enable better delivery.  
In terms of evaluation design, Drew & Clist seek to make a clear distinction between the 
evaluation of the intervention (i.e. the effectiveness of the project itself) and the instrument (i.e. 
the effectiveness of the bond). Evaluating the latter as well as the former will enable stakeholders 
to make a comparison between the value of impact bonds and other alternative funding 
mechanisms. With these factors in mind, they advise on the development of a basic framework to 
guide the evaluation of impact bonds, plus accompanying tools. 
At an international level, evidence generated from synthesising experience across impact bonds 
is seen to be extremely useful at the formative and design stage of new impact bonds (Drew & 
Clist 2015: 19-20). Given the current rate of growth of impact bonds, Drew & Clist also suggest 
that a process of real-time synthesis should be an essential part of such an approach (Drew & 
Clist 2015: 36-37). They propose that, in the first instance, some form of agency-wide active and 
intentional synthesis process – such as that currently used by the Big Lottery Fund to evaluate 
SIBs in the UK – will be needed to ensure that this happens. 
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4. Evidence of impact: two case studies of impact bonds 
Introduction 
In this section, the review presents the available evidence associated with the two impact bonds 
for education that, to date, have been implemented in low- and middle-income contexts: the 
Educate Girls DIB, and the Quality Education India DIB. While only the Educate Girls DIB can 
present data on outcomes achieved, there is a close design relationship between the two bonds 
which may present some evidence associated with the ‘proof of concept’ of the application of 
impact bonds in the development context. 
Case Study 1: Educate Girls, Rajasthan, India 2015-2018 
The Educate Girls DIB was launched in Rajasthan, India in June 2015. It ran for 3 years, and 
final outcomes were announced in November 2018. 
The project objective was to help improve education and learning outcomes for 18,000 children 
in 166 government primary schools in the Indian state of Rajasthan. The project targeted 
enrolment and learning among 9,000 girls not currently enrolled in government primary schools, 
and a further 9,000 children in Grades 3-5 (Social Finance 2019; REACH 2017: 3). 
The key stakeholders in the Development Impact Bond were: 
• Investor: UBS Optimus Foundation5  
• Service Provider: Educate Girls6  
• Outcomes Funder: Children's Investment Fund Foundation (CIFF)7   
• Intermediary agency: Instiglio8  
• Outcome Evaluator: IDinsight9 
• Process Evaluator: Dahlberg10  
• Two additional agencies provided legal and contracting support. 
Project overview 
The Educate Girls DIB was the first to be piloted in a low- or middle-income country with a non-
governmental organisation as Outcomes Funder (Social Finance 2019).  
The project aimed to enrol more girls in schools to improve their educational and wider life 
outcomes, and to improve the achievement of all students enrolled in government schools. The 
project also had a particular focus on marginalised girls and boys in remote rural districts. In 
outlining the identified need for this intervention, in Rajasthan, 40% of girls drop out before 
reaching Grade 5 and for those that remain learning quality is low; only 15% of children in 
                                                   
5 https://www.ubs.com/microsites/optimus-foundation/en/home.html 
6 http://www.educategirls.org/ 
7 www.ciff.org 
8 www.instiglio.org  
9 www.idinsight.org 
10 www.dalberg.com 
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primary school can read a simple story in Hindi. Uneducated girls in India are less likely to 
survive pregnancy and childbirth than their educated peers, marry four years earlier, and are 
three times more likely to contract HIV. Conversely, investing in girls helps disrupt the cycle of 
poverty: educated girls earn 10% more, have healthier and fewer children, and are more likely to 
send their own children to school (Social Finance 2019; Instiglio 2015: 5, 11). 
The role of the DIB was to enable Educate Girls, an Indian NGO and the primary service 
provider, to help address these needs by scaling up its proven programme in Rajasthan and 
address identified needs around the target population. Educate Girls’ programme approach 
consisted of enrolling girls in government schools, and supporting them to stay in education, 
while child-centric learning and teaching techniques improved motivation and learning outcomes 
(CIFF 2019; Social Finance 2019; Instiglio 2015: 12; IDinsight 2018). Additional inputs included 
the engagement of communities through school management committees and awareness-raising 
(Instiglio 2015: 12; IDinsight 2018). The Educate Girls DIB also sought to operate as a 'proof of 
concept' to demonstrate how DIBs can contribute to social good (Social Finance 2019). 
In supporting this, the Investor, UBS Optimus (the philanthropic arm of UBS Bank), provided 
US$270,000 of capital to fund Educate Girls’ programme activities. The Outcome Funder, CIFF, 
reimbursed UBS Optimus for financing Education Girls, plus additional incentive payments, once 
the achievement of agreed measurable educational outcomes for the enrolment of out-of-school 
girls and improved literacy and numeracy skills were met and validated by iDinsight, the 
independent evaluator (CIFF 2019; Social Finance 2019; IDinsight 2018).  
Target outcomes and performance management 
The target outcomes linked with payment to the investor from the outcome funder included: 
• 79% of out-of-school girls aged 7-14 and targeted by the project enrolled in government 
schools over the course of 3 years (20% of outcomes payment) 
• Agreed levels of improved literacy and numeracy skills in maths, Hindi and English (80% 
of outcomes payment).  
For the first target, ‘enrolment’ was defined as the percentage of out-of-school girls who are 
enrolled on school rosters by the end of the project’s three years. For the second target, the 
levels of improved learning were measured using the ASER test, a widely used test of basic 
numeracy and basic literacy in both Hindi and English. Results were measured against a control 
group in a randomised control trial, with ‘impact’ defined as the difference in student learning 
gains between the intervention group and the control group (Social Finance 2019; Boggild-Jones 
& Gustafsson-Wright 2018; Instiglio 2015: 10, 19; IDinsight 2018). 
From a financial perspective, the anticipated investor returns if these targets were met were 7-
13% per annum, with a maximum rate of 15% over 3 years (CIFF 2019; Instiglio 2015: 15). 
In seeking to deliver these, the bond put in place a performance management system that 
focussed on tracking inputs and activities against selected outcomes of its intervention, such as 
out of school girls’ enrolment, student attendance, and learning. This system was designed to 
enable Educate Girls to manage its resources effectively and track progress during service 
delivery. Within this, the bond’s focus on performance management also shifted from managing 
activities to managing results. Therefore, the objective of the performance management was to 
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help track project progress with a view to managing those intermediate outcomes that would lead 
to higher levels of enrolment and learning outcomes of the project (Instiglio 2015: 39).  
To support the performance management process, Instiglio also put in place a coordination 
framework that set out the mechanisms for interaction and information-sharing between 
stakeholders across the 3-year lifetime of the project. These consisted of a number of scheduled 
committees and working groups, plus reporting frameworks (Instiglio 2015: 41-42). 
Evaluation design 
Learning gains on the Educate Girls DIB were evaluated through a quasi-experimental approach, 
using a clustered randomised control trial (IDinsight 2018: 13). Given sampling constraints, the 
Evaluator (IDinsight) used all eligible schools for the evaluation, rather than selecting a random 
sample of schools from the sampling frame. The sample consisted of 396 schools in 338 villages.  
Within eligible villages, all out-of-school girls (based on Educate Girls’ verified lists) were 
included in the sample. Eligible out-of-school girls are those aged 6–14 years, who are mandated 
to be in schools under the Right to Education Act. These include: girls without access to a school 
in their community; girls who don’t enrol despite having a school in their community available; 
girls who enrol, but don’t attend; girls who enrol, but drop out of the education system (UBS 
2018ii: 3). Within eligible schools, learning outcomes were measured by using data on all 
students in grades 1-5 as a baseline (as well as newly-enrolled students).  
To construct the sample and to identify eligible schools, IDinsight used school-level data for the 
two selected blocks in Bhilwara district, Jahajpur and Mandalgarh, collected by the District 
Information System for Education (DISE) in 2013-2014 (Instiglio 2015: 26-34; IDinsight 2018). 
Finally, the evaluation design also took account of a broad range of potential issues the might 
impact on the assessment of outcomes, including those associated with causal identification 
(Instiglio 2015: 36-38; IDinsight 2018). 
Evidence of bond performance and educational impact 
As the world’s first impact bond, the progress of the Educate Girls DIB was carefully tracked and 
reported on throughout its 3-year lifetime. The results show that there was a variable rate of 
progress across the project lifetime. 
In Year 1, there were several project implementation goals set, in terms of the delivery of key 
tasks (see Instiglio 2015: 22-24). In terms of outcomes against targets, it was reported that 
(REACH 2017: 3; CIFF 2016; IDinsight 2018): 
• Against Target 1, the project had enrolled 44% of the 835 girls identified as being out-of-
school across 140 target villages. 
• Against Target 2, the project achieved 23% of the 3-year target for learning improvement 
outcomes.  
• In terms of financial returns, the Investor (UBS Optimus) recouped 40% of their 
US$267,000 investment. 
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Based on these Year 1 results, it was reported that the DIB has been ‘transformational’ in 
delivering impact, with the model closing the gender gap in enrolment and improving children’s 
learning levels in the target location. In addition, the DIB was seen to demonstrate how 
innovative financing models can access new sources of funding while delivering greater impact 
on the ground (CIFF 2016; Instiglio 2015).  
From a design perspective, Educate Girls reported that the DIB’s focus on data collection and 
analysis had affected the organisation’s way of working during Year 1. In particular, this included 
an increase in the feedback and analysis of data from the field to help identify programme 
changes, leading to a flexible and responsive approach being adopted across other programmes. 
Cited examples include when, halfway through the delivery of the curriculum, data showed that 
the girls in the programme were falling behind with English. Investigations revealed that some 
teachers were uncomfortable about their own ability in English and struggling with the lesson 
plans. Teacher support measures were put in place, and girls’ learning subsequently accelerated 
(Educate Girls 2016, cited in CIFF 2016; IDinsight 2018). 
However, key stakeholders also emphasised that DIBs would only likely be relevant for specific 
scenarios. They also placed importance on having a rigorous understanding of the issue to be 
addressed, of any inputs past results, and the institutional capacity to improve internal 
performance and management systems (CIFF 2016; Instiglio 2015). 
In Year 2, it was reported that (REACH 2017: 3; IDinsight 2018): 
• Against Target 1, the project had enrolled 87.7% (579) of the 835 girls identified as being 
out-of-school across 140 target villages. 
• Against Target 2, the project achieved 50.3% of the 3-year target for learning 
improvement outcomes target.  
• In terms of financial returns, the Investor was reported as remaining ‘on track’ to recoup 
its initial funding investment of US$267,000. 
Based on these outcomes, progress against Target 1 on enrolment was going well, but progress 
against Target 2 was regarded as presenting a greater challenge, whether in terms of metric or 
delivery. From these Year 2 results, it was anticipated that, by project end, the Investor (UBS 
Foundation) would recoup only 72% of their initial investment and 54% of the expected outcome 
payment (REACH 2017: 13). 
Finally, in Year 3, it was reported that (Boggild-Jones & Gustafsson-Wright 2018; IDinsight 
2018): 
• Against Target 1, the project had enrolled 92% (768) of the 835 girls identified as being 
out-of-school across 140 target villages, thereby surpassing the 90% target. 
• Against Target 2, the project achieved 160% of the 3-year target for learning 
improvement outcomes target.  
• In terms of financial returns, the outcome funder (CIFF) repaid the investor (UBS 
Foundation) its initial funding investment of US$267,000 plus an internal rate-of-return of 
15% (US$40,050). 
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The final results of the Educate Girls DIB are seen to show impressive gains in both enrolment 
and learning outcomes, with a marked increase in the third year (Boggild-Jones & Gustafsson-
Wright 2018), particularly against the learning target. The final results were verified by evaluator 
IDinsight (2018).  
Against Target 2, student learning outcomes, which made up 80% of the outcome payment, were 
measured for girls and boys using the ASER test for English, Hindi, and Math, in which students 
receive a grade between A-E for each subject. Using a randomised controlled trial, IDinsight 
compared the progress on this test for children receiving the intervention to those in a 
comparison group. The target over the three years was a combined increase of 5,592 more 
learning levels for the students receiving the intervention, above the comparison group (IDinsight 
2018).  
Against the 52% achieved by the end of Year 2, the final year saw a huge increase in learning 
outcomes for the students receiving the intervention: by the end of Year 3, this group had 
improved their test performance by 8,940 more learning levels than the comparison group, 
equivalent to 160% of the target (Boggild-Jones & Gustafsson-Wright 2018; IDinsight 2018). In 
order to achieve this, especially following the poor progress made in Year 2, Educate Girls, as 
the service providers, used new information to improve their service provision, and thereby made 
a number of adjustments to boost students’ success. This included structural changes to delivery 
(e.g. increased number of sessions; teaching groups aligned with competency levels) and 
improved curriculum content which emphasised personalised learning. Additional updates 
included: home visits for persistent absentees, and further training for teachers (Boggild-Jones & 
Gustafsson-Wright 2018; UBS 2018ii: 5; IDinsight 2018). 
Conclusions 
The Educate Girls DIB 2015-2018 overachieved relative to the required targets for enrolment and 
learning outcomes. The evidence is seen to demonstrate two key aspects (Boggild-Jones & 
Gustafsson-Wright 2018): 
• Firstly, the success of the technical design and approach used by Educate Girls 
intervention; 
• Secondly, a proof of concept for impact bonds, in that this DIB: 
o Provided return on investment for UBS Optimus Foundation; 
o Provided a structure of performance management and support for the service 
provider; 
o Used a focus on outcomes to enable the service provider to learn from and 
respond to new information.  
It is argued that the model has led to a raft of innovations, both within the contexts of educational 
provision and social financing through private investment (UBS 2018i: 1; UBS 2018ii: 2). Key 
factors that are seen to have contributed to the DIB’s success include the underlying focus on 
outcomes, combined with a flexible funding structure, which provided the basis for Educate Girls 
to adapt its programme to focus on outcomes around children’s learning as well as enrolment. In 
addition, the performance management system assisted Educate Girls to develop the necessary 
frameworks, processes and capabilities to measure and track outcomes, identifying gaps, and 
draw learnings that would help them achieve the outcome goals more swiftly (UBS 2018ii: 6). 
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In terms of evidence related to the effectiveness of impact bonds, the massive increase in the 
effectiveness of Educate Girls’ programme in the final year suggests that the combination of 
implementer flexibility and rigorous evaluation can create conditions for rapid learning and 
improvements. For example, the first two years of the evaluation showed that children who were 
chronically absent from school were not benefitting from the programme. In the third year, 
Educate Girls added home visits and remedial classes to better reach these students, and 
subsequently their gains were comparable to students who attended school regularly (IDinsight 
2018: 10). However, it is also stated that the benefits of DIBs’ focus on outcomes can only be 
realised if those outcomes are measured and evaluated correctly. Less rigorous methods, such 
as before and after studies, risk reaching the wrong conclusion about whether targets are met, 
thereby damaging the core value proposition of a DIB through incorrect performance payments, 
or ineffective or harmful programme adjustments (IDinsight 2018: 10). 
Finally, in terms of value-for-money, it is important to note that while the results of the evaluation 
demonstrate that the intervention was a success, there is still a lack of rigorous evidence 
assessing the value and impact of the DIB financing mechanism against other financing 
mechanisms (Boggild-Jones & Gustafsson-Wright 2018). 
In discussing this high-profile case, Drew & Clist (2015: 22) also advise caution in placing too 
much emphasis on findings from a single example, particularly in light of concerns over data 
quality, alongside relatively little qualitative analysis of contextual causal mechanisms. 
 
Case Study 2: Quality Education, India, 2018-2022 
The Quality Education India DIB was launched in September 2018 and will run for 3-4 years until 
2021-2022. The project objective is to drive learning outcomes for 300,000 primary school 
children in India through a range of interventions focussed on improving the quality of learning 
rather than on school enrolment and attendance. While it is anticipated that the range of service 
provider inputs will evolve over the project lifetime, initial interventions will include: high-quality 
privately-operated free schooling in urban slums; leadership training for principals and teachers; 
and teacher training in remedial education and multiple-ability classes (Quality Education India 
2019). 
The key stakeholders in the Development Impact Bond are (Quality Education India 2019): 
• Investor: UBS Optimus Foundation  
• Service Providers: Gyanshala11; Kaivalya Education Foundation12; The Society for All 
Round Development13  
• Outcomes Funders: Michael & Susan Dell Foundation14; British Asian Trust15; Tata 
Trusts16; The Mittal Foundation; British Telecom17; Comic Relief18. 
                                                   
11 http://gyanshala.org/ 
12 http://www.kefindia.org/ 
13 http://www.sardindia.org/  
14 https://www.msdf.org/  
15 https://www.britishasiantrust.org/ 
16 http://www.tatatrusts.org/ 
17 http://www.globalservices.bt.com/en 
18 https://www.comicrelief.com/ 
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• Intermediary agency: Dalberg Global Advisors  
• Evaluator: Grey Matter India19  
• Additional technical support in programme management is provided by DFID, and there 
are several additional advisory agencies providing legal support - Hogan Lovells, J. 
Sagar Associates and Reed Smith. 
While the Quality Education India DIB is significantly more complex in scale and scope, the 
design and focus of this DIB draws heavily on the design, approaches and impact of the Educate 
Girls DIB. In this context, the service provider on the Educate Girls DIB, the NGO Educate Girls, 
is also contributing to this DIB in an advisory capacity during 2019 (Social Finance 2019ii). 
Project overview 
The project aims to improve literacy and numeracy skills for more than 300,000 children, with a 
specific focus on learning outcomes. In outlining the need for this intervention, while efforts to 
increase school attendance in India have been very successful during the last 5 years, there 
remains a gap in learning achievement. A typical Indian student is at least two grades behind the 
level expected for their age in literacy and numeracy. By grade 5 (age 10) fewer than 50% of 
children can read to the level of grade 2 (age 7) (Quality Education India 2019). 
In making approaches to address these concerns, the Quality Education India DIB is taking a 
highly adaptive and flexible approach to design. Funding in Year 1 (2019) will be invested in 
three established NGOs, operating to provide different services in different contexts: 
• Gyanshala will provide ‘high-quality privately-operated free schooling’ for primary-school-
aged children living in urban slums in Gujarat.  
• Kaivalya Education Foundation will provide a leadership foundation programme that 
trains principals and teachers in integrated schools in Gujarat.  
• Society for All Round Development will run two programmes in the North of Delhi 
providing government teachers with the skills to teach remedial education and handle 
multiple-ability classes.  
Each year, each service providers’ progress towards agreed outcomes will be assessed, 
including measuring of the interventions’ effectiveness at raising educational outcomes in 
numeracy and literacy (Social Finance 2019ii). In terms of costings, under the Quality Education 
India DIB, just under 80% of funds will be allocated to service provision, with 16% allocated to 
programme management costs and an anticipated 6% set aside as a potential return to the risk 
investor once outcomes are met (Social Finance 2019ii). 
Exploring the relationship between Educate Girls DIB 2015-2018 and Quality Education 
India DIB 2018-2022 
In looking at the decision to roll out and upscale the use of DIBs for education within the same 
national context, India is seen as a good context in which to pilot DIBs as a model for innovative 
financing. Quality Education India (2019) cites the increase in entrepreneurialism in India, the 
willingness of government to work with business and others, the increased levels of financial 
transparency, and the fall in international-aid funding as India's economy has strengthened, as 
                                                   
19 http://www.graymatters.in/ 
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key factors that make the country a good setting in which to explore new ways to approach the 
financing of social development. 
In comparison with the Educate Girls DIB, the Quality Education India DIB involves a significantly 
larger initial investor contribution: US$3m compared with the US$297,000 for Educate Girls DIB. 
Similarly, the current total outcome fund is set at $11m, with a view to enabling the size of the 
DIB to double over the 3-4 year lifetime (Quality Education India 2019).  
In addition, in terms of stakeholders, the Quality Education India DIB currently has multiple 
service providers as well as outcome funders, with the British outcome funders operating as part 
of a consortium formed by the British Asian Trust. It is also anticipated that the range of service 
providers and outcome funders may be extended during 2020 and 2021 (Social Finance 2019ii; 
Quality Education India 2019). 
At a design level, as a result of findings from the Educate Girls DIB, which is described by Quality 
Education India (2019) as ‘a pilot programme’, there are several new design approaches that 
have been taken by the Quality Education India DIB. Firstly, the Quality Education India DIB’s 
outcomes will focus on quality of learning and not on attendance. Secondly, this DIB will spend 
less money on assessment. Thirdly, by working with multiple delivery partners operating across 
differing interventions, this DIB is seen to have diversified the risk. Fourthly, in practical terms, 
the outcome funders will make payments to the risk investor at the end of each year rather than 
just at the very end of the programme (Quality Education India 2019). 
In addition, the Quality Education India DIB is taking a highly adaptive and flexible approach to 
design. Firstly, funding in Year 1 (2019) will be invested in the three established NGOs, each of 
whom will operate to provide clearly different services in different contexts – this is in contrast 
with the Educate Girls DIB, which worked with a single service provider on a limited range of 
inputs within a specific regional context. Secondly, it is anticipated that in subsequent years 
2020-2022, Quality Education India is likely to evolve its social development portfolio by 
engaging further service providers operating to provide additional services in additional contexts, 
thereby expanding the reach and scope of the DIB (Quality Education India 2019). 
There are a number of conclusions that it might be possible to draw from the above. 
Firstly, the scale of the Quality Education India DIB, particularly when based on the design of the 
Educate Girls DIB, can be assumed to provide evidence that the Educate Girls DIB fulfilled the 
necessary ‘proof of concept’ for DIBs in relation to social development, as outlined by Social 
Finance (2019). 
Secondly, the involvement of multiple service providers (and outcome funders) can be assumed 
to provide evidence of DIBs’ functionality to ‘pool performance-based contracts’ (Innovative 
Financing Initiative 2014: 4; 18), in that the flexible framework combines multiple interrelated 
performance-based contracts with a range of service providers under a single management and 
investment framework.  
Thirdly, the adaptive and shape-shifting approach to design and implementation can be assumed 
to provide evidence, or at least a substantial belief among stakeholders, that DIB frameworks 
and delivery mechanisms allow for adaptive and highly flexible approaches to funding social 
development initiatives within an educational context (Quality Education India 2019). 
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Finally, the Quality Education India DIB is also anticipated to build on the Educate Girls DIB’s 
role as a ‘proof of concept’. With the introduction of the extended approaches to delivery see 
above, plus, new perspectives from the broad coalition of actors, it is hoped that this DIB will 
offer valuable lessons for the future of innovative financing for education. In particular, one 
ambition is to use information gathered during the Quality Education India DIB to create an 
education ‘rate card’, which would include details of cost prices for the achievement of particular 
goals to streamline the process of paying for outcomes (Boglidd-Jones & Gustafsson-Wright 
2018i).  
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5. Conclusions 
In summarising the findings of this study, there are a number of conclusions that can be drawn 
from the documentation and data gathered. 
Firstly, there is only limited evidence available that discusses the impact of impact bonds either 
on education or in LMICs. In general terms, the majority of available evidence on impact bonds is 
drawn primarily from Social Impact Bonds designed and implemented in high-income countries, 
in particular the UK and the US (see Drew & Clist 2015; Floyd et al. 2014; Loder et al. 2013; 
REACH 2017) In addition, the majority of available evidence on impact bonds is drawn from 
those bonds implemented in association with interventions in sectors other than education (see 
Drew & Clist 2015; Floyd et al. 2014; Loder et al. 2013; REACH 2017; Terway 2018). 
Within this general context of available evidence, this study found that there is a particularly 
limited literature that discusses the impact of impact bonds on education in LMICs. In practical 
terms, concrete evidence within this scope is available only in reference to the Educate Girls DIB 
2015-2018 and, based on anecdotal or discursive analysis, to the Quality Education India DIB 
2018-2022 that has been implemented partly as a result of the Educate Girls DIB. 
The current limitations on the availability of evidence of impact bonds in relation to education in 
LMICs can be put down to four main factors (Terway 2018; REACH 2017; Boglidd-Jones & 
Gustafsson-Wright 2017):  
• the relative novelty of impact bonds as a financing mechanism, in that they have only 
been widely applied within the last 5 years;  
• related to the above, the fact that only a small number of bonds have yet reached full 
completion;  
• the fact that, to date, impact bonds have been mostly applied in ‘high-yield’ social 
sectors, rather than in education;  
• the fact that, to date, only a very small number have been developed for application in 
national contexts associated with ‘international development’. 
Secondly, in discussing the evidence on impact bonds that is available, analysis from a range of 
commentators highlight a number of additional challenges. Evidence suggests there is a broad 
diversity of approaches to both evaluating impact bonds and reporting on the findings, thereby 
undermining the veracity of findings (see Drew & Clist 2015).  
For example, in general terms, much of the literature available orientates evaluation largely 
around the extent to which the impact bond operates as an effective financial mechanism i.e. in 
terms of an ability to mobilise resources, or fulfil targets associated with outcomes payments to 
investors. As such, there is not necessarily a focus on evaluation in relation to social 
development outcomes. In the context of education, for example, these might include technical 
measures associated with quality of learning, inclusion, enrolment and retention, and so on. 
In addition, commentators conclude that the evaluation of impact bonds is not currently 
conducted using uniform design approaches, largely due to the relative novelty of this 
mechanism. This limits the cross-sectoral relevance of evidence available, and therefore makes 
it difficult to compare findings across cases. In addressing this issue in particular, several 
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commentators make the case for the development of a uniform approach to evaluation design, 
as well as the need for putting in place a centralised synthesised body of evidence on impact 
bonds (see Drew & Clist 2015; REACH 2017). 
Thirdly, despite the limitations of evidence outlined above, it is still possible to draw some 
conclusions on the possible impact of impact bonds on education in LMICs. Based on evidence 
largely drawn from the case of the Educate Girls DIB, findings indicate that, with appropriate 
technical design and highly flexible and adaptive approaches to delivery, impact bonds can have 
a substantial positive impact on educational quality in terms of learning outcomes, on educational 
inclusion, and on school enrolment and retention. However, these results are highly context 
specific and are drawn from a single  case study, so questions of wider applicability and 
robustness should be applied to these conclusions. 
In addition to any sector-specific technical interventions, it is also noted that the design and 
project management of the bond itself are regarded as key factors influencing the attainment of 
specific social development outcomes. In the context of the Educate Girls DIB, it can be argued 
that evidence of the effectiveness of the bond’s approach to design, management and 
implementation is provided by the extent to which this DIB has operated as a ‘pilot’ initiative 
informing the design and implementation of the far larger Quality Education India DIB.  
Fourthly, in terms of value-for-money, the majority of commentators conclude that the current 
evaluation of impact bonds do not adequately assess whether they represent better value-for-
money when compared with other financing mechanisms. This remains the case with the 
Educate Girls DIB, which did not include such a value-for-money comparison as part of its 
evaluation design. While there are a range of hypotheses about why impact bonds may be 
preferable to other models of financing in particular situations, so far there is not an evidence-
based case for choosing impact bonds over other funding models (Floyd et al. 2017: 12). It is 
important to note the continued difficulty in isolating whether using the impact bond financing 
mechanism actually adds value. Even for impact bonds where rigorous evaluations were used to 
measure outcomes, only the effectiveness of the intervention itself was captured. Based on this, 
it is not possible to know if the same results could have been achieved with input-based 
financing, traditional payment by results, or even just providing cash inputs (Boglidd-Jones & 
Gustafsson-Wright 2019). 
To conclude, impact bonds remain a complex and time-intensive mechanism for contracting 
services, and decision-makers must ensure that contracting on outcomes and engaging private 
investors, are the right options for both the context and the social problems they are trying to 
solve. Going forward with this, evidence of impact, both in terms of technical and managerial 
design, will be key to informing the decision-making process. Efforts to streamline this process, 
such as the Education Outcomes Funds for India, and Africa and the Middle East, offer one 
potential solution. Additionally, future DIB architects will need to think carefully about the role of 
the domestic government, and the sustainability of outcomes after the end of the contract, for 
example by ensuring that the government is engaged, and can share in the learning and capacity 
building (Boggild-Jones & Gustafsson-Wright 2018).  
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